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§ 1. The Present Discontent. 
WE are witnessing something like a ferment in the philo-
sophic world. In various directions there are unmistakable 
signs of discontent with the old order. Such discontent is, 
no doubt, chronic in philosophy. Still it is more acute at 
some periods than at others. And it appears to be especially 
acute at the present time. The main causes of this discontent 
are not far to seek. One result of Kant's Idealism and 
Comte's Positivism has been an increasing distrust in human 
knowledge, a growing suspicion of the foundations of science. 
In a sense, this was the very opposite of what these 
philosophers really intended. But then results sometimes 
have this disagreeable way of showing no respect even for 
the best intentions. The trouble was not with the professed 
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142 A. WOLF. 
philosophers. They shed no idle tears over Matter, Space, or 
Time. On the whole they found it rather edifying to con-
template a purely spiritual world sub specie ccternitatis. The 
trouble arose chiefly with the physicists. Physicists, it is 
true, have a way of despising metaphysics. But it is only 
other people's metaphysics for which they profess contempt. 
For themselves, they rather indulge their weakness for meta-
physics, and call it by another name. At all events, in the 
hands of physicists the philosophy of Kant and of Comte 
seems to have developed into an exaggerated phenomenalism. 
In one respect this exercised a good influence on physicists: 
it made them uncommonly modest. Compared with the 
hoastfulness of Laplace and the confidence of the classical 
physicists generally, latter-day physicists are extraordinarily 
modest. Many of them have abandoned the attempt to 
penetrate the secret of Nature's mechanism, they seem rather 
doubtful even about the validity of far less ambitious theories. 
The theoretical constructions of science, we have been told, 
are largely factitious, they give us no image of reality, they 
are little more than a mirage. The so-called Laws of Nature 
are only conventional shorthand summaries of past experience, 
and carry with them no warranty with reference to the future. 
To rely on them as regards future events is simply to draw 
cheques on Nature in the uncertain and unfounded hope that 
they may be honoured.* This vein of modesty, itself the 
'outcome of various philosophic influences, has in its turn 
called forth a similar tendency in philosophy. Pragmatism— 
or at least one of the rather numerous and perplexing 
tendencies for which this name now stands—is, I take it, an 
attempt to furnish a more academic philosophic basis for this 
scientific tendency. " Truth," science laments, " absolute truth 
is beyond us, our theories are at best but shadows, though, 
* See, for instance, Professor Lamb's Address at the Cambridge 
Meeting of the British Association {Report 1904). 
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strangely enough, they work somehow." " Why!" Pragmatism 
answers, " your working theories are the very truths you want 
—the eternal, immaculate truths which you lament, they are 
mere shadows that disquiet you all in vain." 
I described the scientific attitude just referred to as one 
of modesty. I am not disinclined to describe Pragmatism 
similarly. Some people will probably disagree. Perhaps the 
way in which the claims of Pragmatism are pushed may have 
something to do with this. Some people prefer to describe 
this attitude as one of Scepticism. I will not decide between 
these designations. I t is certainly difficult to draw the line 
between modesty and diffidence. 
Unfortunately for this modest estimate of human know-
ledge, scientific results have been accumulating rapidly, and 
their practical effects have been of the greatest service. 
Xeedless to say, the modest epistemologists themselves have 
rendered most valuable services in this advance—though as 
scientists, not as epistemologists. Now the natural m a n -
even in scientists and philosophers—finds it somewhat 
tantalising to suppose that " laws" so uncertain in their 
nature should nevertheless prove so reliable. Certainly, in 
our practical everyday life, cheques drawn at random are not 
honoured at our pleasure. There must be something definite 
and substantial corresponding to our cheques. The low 
estimate of human knowledge seems, therefore, excessively 
modest, not to say unduly sceptical. Our theories would not 
work if they were not true. They may not be the whole 
truth, but they must be true as far as they go. Perhaps, 
after all, we do know the lealities, and not merely their 
shadows. Hence the present ferment and discontent. Hinc 
ilia; lacrimal. The natural man has no misgivings about the 
validity of his knowledge. May not his confidence, after all, 
be better founded than the philosopher's diffidence? Such 
are the heart searchings of philosophy at the present day. 
L 2 






144 A. WOLF. 
§ 2. The Naturalness of Natural Realism. 
Schiller's gibe at philosophy (in Die Weltweisen) is well 
known. It may be regarded as a compliment to jesting Pilate, 
who would not wait for an answer. Philosophy moves at such 
a leisurely pace, and its course is so irregular and uncertain, 
that it would be cruel to leave mankind to its mercy for their 
knowledge of the world, and the conduct of their lives. Hence, 
so Schiller tells us, Nature exercised her motherly care and 
endowed men—even unreflective men—with an instinctive 
knowledge of things, and an instinctive social morality, lest 
the cosmic and social order should fall to pieces for want of 
a comprehensive philosophy to keep it together. Now the 
cognitive attitude of the so-called plain man is commonly 
described as one of naive Realism. Schiller would, no doubt, 
have preferred to describe it as Natural Realism, for the 
reason already suggested. And so long as it is remembered 
that we are dealing, not with a philosophic system, but with 
a pre-philosophic attitude, that is to say, not with an explicit 
but only with an implicit philosophy, there can be no harm in 
calling it Natural Realism, although the name is generally 
reserved for a deliberate philosophic view which seeks to 
justify the unconscious assumptions of the naive realism of the 
unreflective or unsophisticated man. At all events, it is 
commonly admitted that, though more or less unconscious, 
the cognitive attitude of the unsophisticated man, or of 
Common Sense, is that of Natural Realism. Moreover, even 
as regards professed philosophers, whatever their philosophy 
may be during hours of secluded meditation, no sooner do they 
pass from the privacy of their study into the fresh air of the 
world outside than they inevitably relapse into the realistic 
attitude of the plain man. I t is in vain, says Thomas Re id, 
that even the greatest sceptic " strains every nerve, and 
wrestles with nature, and with every object that strikes upon 
his senses. For, after all, when his strength is spent in the 
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fruitless attempt, he will be carried down the torrent with the 
common herd of believers."* Hume admitted as much, and 
more. " Nature (he said) will always maintain her rights, and 
prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever."! 
In fact, Hume went further than that. There were times 
when " the privilege of a sceptic" weighed rather heavily on 
him. In one such moment, at least, he made a remarkable 
and interesting confession, which almost reminds one of 
Schiller's reference to Nature's motherly care. " Most fortu-
nately it happens (Hume wrote) that since reason is incapable 
of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that 
purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and 
delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind or by some 
avocation and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate 
all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, 
I converse with my friends; and when after three or four 
hours' amusement I would return to these speculations, they 
appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find 
it in my heart to enter into them any further."! These lapses 
into Natural Realism are to be met with occasionally even in 
the actual systems of philosophers who are opposed to it in 
every way. And Sir William Hamilton, as is well known, 
has compiled more than thirty closely printed pages of references 
in evidence of " the Universality of the Philosophy of Common 
Sense, or its general recognition in Reality and in Name, . . . 
from the dawn of speculation to the present day."§ 
Such lapses into Natural Realism, on the part of philo-
sophers who are otherwise opposed to it, seem to illustrate the 
old truth expressed by Horace, in the familiar line— 
Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret. 
In any case it cannot be gainsaid that they are, pro tanto, 
* Works, p. 184. 
t Inquiry, Sect. V, Part I. 
\ Treatise, Part IV, Sect. vii. 
S The Works of Thomas lleid, pp. 776-803. 
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so much evidence in favour of Natural Realism. Every 
philosophy which does not assimilate and cover the everyday 
attitude of its professors stands self-condemned. Its short-
comings have to be supplemented by Natural Realism as a 
working philosophy for the workaday world. Any considerable 
deviation from the Philosophy of Common Sense, any attempt 
to supplant instead of merely supplementing it, seems destined 
to fail. Hence the repeated efforts to come to terms with 
Natural Realism. 
The present discontent with the older order in so far as it 
has a constructive side is marked by its unmistakable realistic 
tendency. Some openly avow a new Realism even more 
realistic than Natural Realism, others would repudiate the 
name of Natural Realists, and are tending more towards a new 
Monadism or a new Pragmatism, but the realistic tendency 
is clearly present in all. The recent writings of Professor 
Alexander, Professor Bergson, Professor James, Piofessor 
Hicks, Dr. Moore, Professor Read, Mr. Russell, Dr. Schiller 
and others, may be cited in proof of this tendency. The 
present writer is of opinion that the case of Natural Realism 
has generally been abandoned much too readily, that its posi-
tion is more defensible than is commonly supposed. And the 
object of this paper is to take a general survey of the position, 
to defend Natural Realism as far as possible, and to compare it 
with some of the present deviations from it. 
§ 3. Method in Philosophy. 
Before proceeding any further, however, it is necessary to 
come to some preliminary understanding as to what is required 
for a philosophic defence of the attitude of Common Sense. 
In some ways Descartes has exercised a bad influence on 
modern philosophy. His de omnibus duMtandvm—the method 
with which he thought that he set out on his philosophic 
mission—seems to have exercised a fatal fascination over many 
modern thinkers. I t looks sometimes as though the main 
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purpose of philosophy were to doubt wherever doubt is at all 
possible, as though its main object were, not to explain, but to 
explain away. Descartes' own philosophy, of course, did not 
really begin with universal doubt. A philosophy which really 
begins with universal doubt also ends there. To make any 
progress at all you must have something firm to stand upon. 
Descartes, it will be remembered, compared himself to 
Archimedes looking for a fixed point in order to raise a world. 
He thought that he had found such a fixed point in himself— 
cogito ergo sum. But lie was mistaken. With such a merely 
thinking self for starting-point, he might perhaps turn a 
somersault, but he could make no real advance. In philosophy, 
as in science and in life, you must begin by accepting the 
validity of normal perception. That is what Descartes really 
did after some parleying, and a show of the most exacting 
cautiousness. He declined to give recognition to the world of 
perception, but rather eagerly admitted the existence of God, 
and then graciously admitted the world of perception on the 
strength of a divine recommendation. Such a de omnibus 
dubitandum looks rather farcical. First he strained at a gnat, 
then swallowed a camel in order to get at the gnat. 
Descartes (though, of course, not he alone) also set ah 
unfortunate example in yet another way, though it is inti-
mately connected with the foregoing. His excessive rationalism 
—his disdain for perception—tended to encourage an exces-
sively conceptual and deductive procedure, as though everything 
could be accounted for deductively from general principles. 
This betrays itself to some extent in the form, at least, even of 
his cogito ergo sum, which, after all, was intended to be the 
fixed starting-point of his philosophy. I t is owing to this 
excessive rationalism—or Conceptualism, as I should prefer to 
call it in this connexion—that such undue stress is sometimes 
laid on Consistency (or the Law of Contradiction) as the sole 
test of reality and truth. Descartes, we are told by Cousin, 
asserted his own existence even, not on the ground of the 
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direct testimony of immediate consciousness, but only because 
his non-existence would involve a contradiction I Now, great 
as is the Law of Contradiction, it really is not sufficient to build 
a solid world upon, and although perceptual data are, as a 
matter of fact, often smuggled into such conceptual systems, 
yet we need not be surprised that these ideal worlds do seem 
rather thin and eery, unlike anything in heaven or on earth. The 
Law of Contradiction, even if you will give it a positive appear-
ance by calling it the Law of Consistency, is after all only a 
negative principle, and not a positive basis of knowledge. The 
real root of the tree of knowledge is perception. The Law of 
Contradiction is but the pruning knife. Perception carries its 
own justification with it, and must not be doubted simply 
because doubt is, in a vague way, possible. Doubt everything, 
and you may as well doubt whether you are really doubting. 
Perception is not always true, nor does it give us the whole 
truth. But from it we start, and by it we are guided; and 
unless we rely on the guidance of normal perception, the very 
ground of knowledge is removed from under our feet. 
§ 4. The Epistemological Implication of Natural Realism. 
" Naive Consciousness (as Lotze remarks*) always takes 
sensation to be the perception of a complete, externally existing, 
real thing. I t believes that the world lies around us illuminated 
by its own radiance, and that outside of us tones and odours cross 
and meet one another in the immeasurable space that plays in 
the colours belonging to things. Our senses sometimes close 
themselves against this continual abundance, and confine us to 
the course of our inner life; sometimes they open like doors to 
the arriving stimulus, to receive it as it is in all its grace or 
ugliness. No doubt disturbs the assurance of this belief, and 
even the illusions of the senses, insignificant in comparison with 
the preponderance of consentient experience, do not shake the 
* Microcosmut, Book III , Ch. IV, § 1. 
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assurance that we here everywhere look into an actual world that 
does not cease to be as it appears to us, even when our attention 
is not turned to it. The brightness of the stars seen by the 
night watcher will, he hopes, continue to shine over him in 
slumber; tones and perfumes, unheard and unsmelt, will be 
fragrant and harmonious afterwards as before; nothing of the 
sensible world will perish save the accidental perception of it 
which consciousness formerly possessed." This account of the 
attitude of common sense is somewhat exaggerated. Of 
course, the plain man would not, and could not, describe his 
outlook in just such terms. But it is sufficiently accurate for 
our purposes. 
Now the fundamental assumption underlying this realistic 
attitude of common sense is that normally the things which 
we apprehend are really there, and that we apprehend them 
just as they are. The plain man would not describe his 
cognitive attitude that way, but that is simply because he 
does not even suspect that all his experiences might be purely 
subjective, or that it is conceivable for a real thing to be 
perceived in a mediate or indirect way. And even the more 
reflective man, who has made acquaintance with rival philo-
sophic theories, if he does not simply quote theories, or if he 
does not deliberately re-interpret his experience, will describe 
his apprehension of things as being of the same realistic and 
immediate or direct character as in the case of the unsophisti-
cated plain man. Professor Alexander has done good service 
by insisting on the importance of beginning with first-hand 
descriptions of facts and experiences, instead of second-hand 
technical accounts with their implicit interpretations and 
misinterpretations.* An unsophisticated description of our 
experience in apprehending things would certainly not be in 
terms of mediate or representative perception, but in terms of 
direct or immediate perception. Usually when we say that 
* See The Journal of Education for March and April, 1909. 
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we touch the ground, or see the stars, or smell wallflowers, we 
literally mean what we say. We mean that the ground, stars, 
and wallflowers are really there, and that we perceive thew. 
themselves, and not some sort of representations of them. 
If all human experiences had been normal this assumption 
would never have been questioned; in fact, it would probably 
never come to be explicitly realised, but would have remained 
implicit. But there are such things as illusions and hallucina-
tions and other forms of error. And the need of a theory of 
error has inevitably led to a theory of knowledge, an examina-
tion of the implicit assumptions of the cognitive attitude of 
common sense. The result, as we know, has been almost fatal 
to the philosophy of Natural Realism. Idealistic theories of 
knowledge have had it almost all their own way, and the 
predominance of idealistic metaphysics seems to be the logical 
result of the predominance of idealistic epistemology. The 
metaphysics of Natural Realism or Natural Dualism can only 
rest on a realistic epistemology, that is, on a theory of know-
ledge which shall embody the essentials of the implicit 
assumptions of common sense. What the fundamental assump-
tion is we have already seen. I t is this, that in normal 
perception real things are presented to us, and we apprehend 
them just as they are. This is what Sir William Hamilton 
called Real Presentationism. The question, therefore, is, 
how far can such a theory of knowledge be philosophically 
defended ? 
§ 5. Ileal Presentationism. 
Although the ontology of Natural Realism requires the 
epistemology of Real Presentationism to justify it, this theory 
of knowledge is also maintained by others who are not natural 
realists. Professor Alexander, for instance, has been insisting 
recently that mind is simply a system of processes or reactions 
directed to various objects which are presented to it im-
mediately without the intervention of any tertium quid. 
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Dr. Moore has likewise maintained that cognition is essentially 
diaphanous or transparent, and does not in any way colour or 
modify the things known. If 1 understand them rightly 
neither Professor Alexander nor Dr. Moore can be described 
as natural realists, but their epistemology has much in common 
with Ileal Presentationism. If I may be allowed to restrict 
the name Eeal Presentationism to denote a theory of normal 
perception only, then we might say that the epistemology of 
Professor Alexander and Dr. Moore includes Eeal Presenta-
tionism and a good deal besides. What the additional elements 
are, and how far they are philosophically justifiable, we shall 
consider afterwards. For the present I am glad to note that 
there is this strong tendency towards Eeal Presentationism, 
as is evidenced by the various papers read before the 
Aristotelian Society by Professor Alexander, Professor Hicks, 
Dr. Moore, and others. 
§ 6. Real Presentationism a-iid Normal Perception. 
As a theory of normal perception Eeal Presentationism is 
undoubtedly most plausible, because it is so natural. Try to 
give a bare description of what happens in any instance of 
normal perception, and you can describe it no otherwise than 
as the direct presentation of the perceived thing to the 
perceiver. Introduce any tertium quid into your account of 
the transaction, and its rdle seems to be as thankless as that 
of any meddling busybody. I t seems so unnatural to suppose 
that when seeing a tree it is not really the tree we apprehend 
mentally, but only some kind of a shadow introjected into us 
by the tree, or that the tree is not really there at all, or at all 
events is not really a tree, and what we are dealing with is 
either wholly or partly our own creation. This prejudice 
against the intervention of a tertium quid in normal perception 
is not only natural but seems to be fully justified by the 
scientific rule not to multiply entities unnecessarily. I t seems 
reasonable enough, therefore, to abandon all such supposed 
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mediating images, shadows, and percepts to the tender mercies 
of Occam's razor. For, after all, even if we admit such images 
we still assume that something is apprehended immediately, 
namely, these supposed images, otherwise we shall be com-
mitted to an infinite regression of such mediating shadows— 
the story of the elephant and the tortoise over again. Why 
not, therefore, assume at once that it is the things themselves 
which are apprehended ? 
And if we are asked for any independent evidence in con-
firmation of such a theory of Real Presentationism, we are not 
altogether at a loss. For there certainly are cognitive pro-
cesses which are devoid of all imagery, except perhaps the 
most fragmentary verbal imagery. The experiments of Buehler 
and others leave no doubt on this point. Similar experi-
ments, which I conducted with a number of very reliable 
subjects, confirm this general result. The fact itself was, of 
course, known long ago—long before these experiments were 
even dreamed of. What is called a general idea need not be 
an image, or involve any imagery; it is essentially a scheme 
of imageless mental processes. And if it is possible for the 
higher cognitive processes to take place without imagery, it 
seems reasonable enough to assume, on the direct evidence of 
naive consciousness, that in perception also we have such 
imageless mental activity operating immediately on external 
things. 
§ 7. Objections against Heal Presentationism. 
So long as we confine ourselves to normal perception the 
case for Real Presentationism appears to be very strong, as 
I have tried to show. But already at this stage certain 
objections may be, and have been, urged against the theory.: 
(i) Perception is a mode of cognition or knowledge. As such 
it involves relativity. The object perceived is not known as it 
is in itself, but only in its relation to the perceiver. So that, 
after all, supposing even that no imagery, no " sensible species " 
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intervene between the perceived object and the perceiving 
mind, still the object is only known as perceived, not as it is by 
itself and apart from this relationship of being apprehended, 
(ii) In the second place, we know as a matter of fact that 
perception is mediated by physiological factors (the nervous 
system) and physical factors (air-waves, ether-waves, and 
odoriferous particles). Must we not therefore suppose that 
these media really make it impossible for us to apprehend 
things directly, and as they actually are ? 
§ 8. The Relativity of Knowledge. 
The first of the above objections is one of a multitude of 
things described by the ambiguous expression "relativity of 
knowledge." But it has the best claim to this title. Now it 
is true that we are, at present, only concerned with it in so far 
as it may affect the validity of Eeal Presentationism as a 
theory of normal perception. Our remarks, however, are 
intended to apply to it quite generally. 
The objection simply take3 for granted the very point at 
issue. To be known is undoubtedly a kind of relationship. 
But then there are relationships and relationships. Even in 
our everyday life we discriminate between relationships which 
are comparatively external and make no appreciable difference 
to the things or persons related, and relationships which are 
more intimate and do affect the related objects or persons. 
My relationship, say, to my parents is no doubt an integral 
part of myself. But this can scarcely be said of my relation-
ship to my next-door neighbour or to my hat. My hat is 
certainly related to me in a different way according as it is on 
my head, or in my hand, or on the peg outside. But, these 
actual relationships apart, it can scarcely be maintained that it 
makes any real difference to me or to my hat whichever of 
these relations happens to hold good. The question, therefore, 
whether an object which is related to another is in any way 
altered by this relationship, depends, not on the mere fact 
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of relationship, but on the character of that relationship. And 
to allege that the object known becomes altered by the very 
fact that it stands in this relationship of being known, is an 
unwarranted assumption. As regards, more particularly, 
normal perception, the suggestion seems to be unnatural to 
a degree. Even normal perception, it is true, is fragmentary, 
incomplete. But to know a thing incompletely, is a very 
different thing from having a distorted, or illusory apprehension 
of it. Our experience in normal perception carries with it the 
highest degree of certainty, and may not be called in question 
until there are positive reasons for suspecting it to be abnormal. 
To question its validity simply on the ground of the relation-
ship which all knowledge involves is sheer paradox : to know 
anything is to stand to it in the relation of knowing i t ; but 
just because you stand in the relation of knowing it therefore 
you cannot know it. The relationship between the knower 
and the known certainly appears to be a transparent relation, 
which does not affect the object known, nor the person 
knowing, except in so far as his knowledge is thereby 
increased. The burden of the proof lies on those who would 
maintain the contrary. 
§ 9. The Physiology of Normal Perception and its Validity. 
The fact that in all perception there is physiological 
mediation, that perception only follows on the stimulation of 
sense-organs and the transmission of these stimuli to the brain 
along complex nerve-paths, has been constantly used as an 
argument to prove that we do not know what things are, but only 
how they affect us. The physical world as it really is is quite 
different from what we perceive it to be. Not that nature as 
it is in itself is necessarily richer than it appears to us. The 
contrary may be nearer to the truth. Lotze, it will be remem-
bered, speaks of the external world as moving and gesticulating 
in vain until the sentient mind conies to its rescue and voices 
its mute strivings. All the music of the spheres is hushed in 
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the profoundest silence for want of a willing ear. All the rich 
profusion of colour and comeliness in heaven and on earth is 
lost in darkness and gloom for want of a friendly eye. Except 
for us, or the like of us, all, or nearly all, the wonders and 
glories of nature would cease to be, and the external world 
would resume its colourless, soundless, and scentless revelry of 
restless atoms. All the same, it may be urged, infinitely richer 
and more interesting though this world of appearances may be, 
it is but appearance and not reality. How, then, can it be said 
that things are known as they are ? 
The objection has been stated in its more sober form, in 
which it is more or less compatible with Hypothetical Eealism. 
It is sometimes urged in a more extravagant form, in support of 
the contention that " the whole choir of heaven and furniture 
of earth" are only sense-impressions on our brains. In tin's 
form the objection rather over-reaches itself. For, on the same 
grounds, we should have to admit that the brain itself is only 
such a complex of sense-impressions on—what ? Not on the 
brain surely, but at the most only on an unknown something. 
At best this is explaining ignotum per ccque ir/notum; it may 
even be suspected of trying to explain the known by the 
unknown. For, from this standpoint it is too much of an 
assumption to speak of " impressions " at all. On the other 
hand, if you admit the reality of the brain on the strength of 
your perception (of other people's brains), why reject the 
validity of your other perceptions ? 
Natural consciousness certainly seems to bear witness that 
in perception it is the things which we perceive and not the 
physiological media. We seem to know the things perceived 
long before we learn of the physiological factors involved in 
perception. In fact, we only come to know of these physio-
logical factors when we apprehend them (that is, in others, of 
course), in the same way that we apprehend other material 
objects. Unless we assume that our normal apprehension of 
material objects is valid, then we have really no case, because 
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we are not entitled to speak of the nervous system. And if 
we do admit our knowledge of the physiological factors, then 
we are equally entitled to admit the validity of our appre-
hension of all objects of normal perception. In short, the 
burden of the proof falls on those who would discredit per-
ception, and their arguments are not conclusive. The physio-
logical factors, after all, may only constitute (as they appear to 
constitute) the mechanism of apprehension, and need not, as 
such, modify the objects apprehended. We are familiar with 
processes of transmission which leave unaffected the objects 
transmitted. And if it is urged that the case is not quite 
analogous, we are quite content to admit that cognition is not 
like anything else, and beg opponents also to bear that in 
mind.* The fact that even naive consciousness would admit 
that, say, a coloured surface is not like nerve-processes, and 
that nerve-processes have no likeness to the perceptions of 
colour, is no valid objection to our natural assumption that in 
the end it is the coloured surface that we apprehend, and that 
we apprehend it just as it is. And we might even invoke the 
aid of something analogous in mathematics; for the fact that x 
is not equal to y and y is not equal to z does not prove that x 
is not equal to z. The knowledge, therefore, that normal 
perception is mediated in these ways may well supplement, 
but need not invalidate ordinary perceptual cognition. 
Lastly, to anticipate the position which I shall endeavour 
to defend in a subsequent section, the above objection to 
Natural Eeaiisin—the objection based on the physiology of 
* The uniqueness of the cognitive relationship is also apt to be 
obscured somewhat by extreme upholders of Real Presentationism. 
When A is known to B, A is simply present to B. Therefore, it is 
argued, when A is present to D we should, in consistency, say that O 
knows A. But, unless I) is a conscious being, this is an inaccurate form 
of expression, because " knowledge" not only implies the " presence " of 
A to B (of the known to the Icnower), but also that unique cognitive 
attitude of B to A (of the knower to the known), which is only possible 
when B is a conscious being. 
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perception—implicitly rests, it appeal's to me, on an un-
warranted assumption, namely, that the body is something 
quite distinct from the mind, though the mind may somehow 
utilise the body as its instrument. This kind of vivisection of 
the whole man is not suggested by natural consciousness, it is 
the result of philosophic reflection, and has permeated popular 
thought simply as the result of religious teaching. To natural 
consciousness man is a concrete unity, and not a dualism, 
except by way of abstraction. And so long as we do not adopt 
a dualistic attitude the nervous processes in perception form 
no kind of " external" medium on which objections to the 
validity of normal perception might be based. 
§ 10. The Physics of N01 mal Perception and its Validity. 
We turn next to the objection against Keal Presentationism, 
based on the physical mediation of perception. So far we have 
endeavoured to vindicate Real Presentationism against objections 
based on what may be called the relatively inner nature and 
mechanism of perception. We tried to maintain that there is 
nothing in the character of this inner apparatus to necessitate 
the assumption that there is anything of the nature of a veil, 
any tertium quid interposed between the.knower and the known 
in the case of normal perception. So far as the constitution of 
the knower is concerned, we endeavoured to show that there is 
no cause for suspecting the validity of normal perception, no 
reason for supposing that we only see things as " through a glass 
darkly." But now we are confronted with something which does 
seem to be of the nature of an external medium. Our normal 
perceptions, it is admitted, are mostly mediated by such physical 
media as air-waves, ether-waves, and odoriferous particles. 
Except in the case of touch, we do not come into immediate 
contact with the things apprehended; are we then justified in 
supposing that things are apprehended as they really are, or 
must we allow that we only know them as modified by these 
physical media ? 
M 
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So far as the scent of things is concerned, there is no real 
mediation. The odoriferous particles emanate from the thing, 
are parts of the thing itself, and their contact with the sense-
organ is, to all intents and purposes, therefore, direct. As 
regards sound, the most that can be maintained is that sound 
belongs not to the sounding body by itself, but to it in conjunc-
tion with the air-waves. This, however, in no way undermines 
the validity of the perception. To perceive a sounding body in 
conjunction with air-waves is to perceive it in its actual setting. 
And although it is desirable to discover the separate character 
of each of the co-operating factors, still even if we fail in this 
it is no support for any argument to prove the relativity of 
knowledge. For, to know things in their actual relations is to 
know them as they really are. Similarly with visual perception. 
The objects seen are seen only through the co-operation of ether-
waves. But in so far as this co-operation or relation is actual, 
they are seen as they actually are, whether or not we can 
discover the separate character of each of the co-operating 
factors. 
The most, then, that need be allowed on the score of 
the physical mediation of perception is this, that things 
are not apprehended as they are in isolation, or independently 
of one another, but only in their mutual relations. This may 
sound rather like the familiar view, that we do not know things 
themselves, but only their phenomena or appearances. In 
reality, however, there is no logical connexion between these 
two views. Since things are mutually interrelated, and not 
disconnected, to know them in their mutual relations is to know 
them as they really are, and not simply as they appear to be. 
In short, the knowledge of things in their relations is a very 
different thing from the relativity of knowledge. 
The same argument might also be used against those who 
attack the validity of normal perception on the ground that 
we only know things in relation to ourselves. For, even so, 
we still know them in relation to something real, to which they 
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are actually related, and therefore we know them as they 
really are. 
Whilst insisting on the interrelation of things, it may be 
necessary to guard against the misconception that things con-
sist only of relations. This is not at all what I mean. All relations 
require terms. Things must severally have their own separate 
characters before they can enter into mutual relations. And it 
is certainly desirable to discover the separate or independent 
character of the terms related. Nor is this task altogether an 
impossible one. It is true that we only apprehend things in 
their mutual relations in more or less complex contexts. But 
this does not prevent us from conceiving their several indepen-
dent characters. Consciously or unconsciously we apply the 
familiar scientific rule of varying the circumstances. Properties 
which are always present under the most diverse conditions are 
regarded as the essential properties of those things, while those 
which are sometimes present and sometimes absent, according 
to circumstances, are considered to be the joint products of 
properties possessed by (or rather constituting) that thing, and 
Certain other conditions, whose presence or absence thus results 
in the appearance or disappearance of such secondary qualities. 
This brings us to the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, which we must now consider briefly. 
§ 11. Primary and Secondary Qualities. 
The difference between primary and secondary qualities is 
not always admitted; and even those who admit the distinction 
are not agreed as to the grounds of the distinction. But we 
are not concerned here with the history of the subject; we are 
only concerned to indicate how the foregoing views affect this 
problem. It might appear at first that on the view of real 
presentationism the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities is untenable. To some extent this is true. If the 
distinction is made to correspond with that of objective 
qualities and subjective sensations, then, just as from the 
M 2 
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standpoint of idealist epistemology, there is no room for the 
distinction, inasmuch as both the so-called primary and 
secondary qualities are in a sense subjective, that is, dependent 
on mind, so, on the contrary, from the point of view of real 
presentationism, there is no room for this distinction, because 
they are both of them objective. Nevertheless the two sets of 
qualities may be usefully distinguished even from the stand-
point of realist epistemology, though on different and perhaps 
truer grounds. 
Reference has already been made, in the preceding section, 
to the fact that in the case of touch the sense-organ is in 
immediate contact with its object, so that there is no external 
physical mediation such as in the case of sound, for instance. 
We have also pointed out above that, while some properties of 
things are observed in them amid the most varying circum-
stances, others are only apprehended under special conditions. 
Now, those properties of things which are apprehended imme-
diately and under the most diverse external conditions 
constitute the primary qualities, while those which are either 
not apprehended immediately (but only through the media-
tion of, say, air-waves or ether-waves), or are not always 
apprehended, are secondary. The primary qualities are com-
plete in the separate character of the separate things, and 
that is why they are apprehended under the most diverse 
external conditions. The so-called secondary qualities are 
really complexes produced partly by conditions found in 
the separate character of the things in question, and partly by 
other conditions found in other things (say, ether-waves or 
air-waves), and are consequently not always present. The 
importance commonly attached to the sense of touch is really 
due, I think, to the fact that in touch, as already explained, 
there is no external mediation, the contact witli the object being 
immediate. Visual perception, on the other hand, is mediated 
by ether-waves, and that is why we like to confirm or correct 
visual perception by reference to touch when possible. 
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Secondary qualities as well as primary qualities are, 
therefore, strictly objective on this view. The fact that they 
are conditioned by conditions which are not always found 
together in any one thing is no argument against their 
objectivity. No doubt it would in some respects be wiser to 
indicate the precise permanent or primary qualities of the 
things concerned instead of attributing to them the secondary 
qualities of which they are only partial conditions. That is, 
of course, what physical science always tries to do—with 
what success does not concern us at present. On the whole, 
however, the attitude of naive consciousness is justifiable. 
The secondary qualities are objective, and even if all the 
constituent factors or conditions are not usually stated or 
recognised explicitly, neither are they explicitly denied. 
What we have said of secondary qualities is equally true 
of, and much more obvious in the cases of, such qualities as 
" fragile," " brittle," " inflammable," and the like, which might 
almost be included among secondary qualities. Here what is 
held in view is a certain result, only some of the conditions 
of which are present in the things so described. The main 
difference between these and secondary qualities is that there 
is an explicit consciousness of the requirement of other con-
ditions than those already present in the bodies concerned. It 
is the presence of some of the requisite conditions and the 
absence of the others that really constitutes the " permanent 
possibilities " of such things. Mere possibilities are nothing ; 
these possibilities, however, are realities, only considered with 
reference to certain results of which they form only a part, and 
not the totality of conditions. 
§ 12. Real Presentationisn\ and Imagination and Memory. 
Assuming for the present that Beal Presentationism has 
been vindicated as a theory of normal perception, it remains 
to be seen whether it is also applicable to other modes of 
normal cognition—imagination and memory. Several attempts 
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have been made to justify such an extension of the theory of 
Eeal Presentationism. But, though the case has been made to 
appear plausible, the arguments do not appear to me to be 
convincing. I t has been urged that in memory and imagina-
tion, as in perception, what we have is still merely an 
apprehension of physical things—though the process of 
apprehension is, of course, peculiar. An imagined tree or a 
remembered tree is as much a physical object as a perceived 
tree is ; only the apprehension in the former case is of a 
different kind from that in the latter case. The real point at 
issue, however, is not whether a remembered tree or an 
imagined one is physical or quasi-physical, but whether in 
remembering or imagining a tree all that belongs to the 
mental side of the relationship is a transparent process, such 
as we supposed in the case of perception. Now I do not for 
a moment deny that normal memory and imagination are 
modes of cognition whereby we are in touch with the real 
world. But, all the same, all imagery is essentially repre-
sentative. A remembered tree, even an imagined tree, may be 
physical, no doubt. But an imagined tree or a remembered 
tree is not the same as an image or a memory-image of a tree. 
And the image is not physical, but mental. In all imagery 
(though it may represent something physical and may 
in that sense be regarded as quasi-physical) we have 
essentially mediate presentation, not direct presentation— 
and the medium is mental. In a sense it is, of course, 
possible to distinguish the image from our having it, and then 
the image might be regarded as apprehended in the same 
direct way as physical things are apprehended (on the theory 
of Real Presentationism). But the cases are not really 
similar.' The physical things exist in space, whether we know 
them or not; but where, in what limbo of footless fancies, 
shall we suppose these images and memories to spend their 
fleeting unsubstantial existence in times of neglect, when we 
do not apprehend them, and even at the moment when we do 
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apprehend them ? If they are not a part of the mind, nor a 
part of physical nature, what then are they ? 
The conclusion seems, therefore, unavoidable, that all forms 
of imagination differ very materially from normal perception. 
In normal perception the mental process is transparent, while 
the content consists of the presented physical object; in imagi-
nation both process and content are mental, though the content 
is also representative of something physical (actual or supposed). 
§ 13. Mental Activity. 
I fail to see any valid objection to the above conclusion. 
Why should we not accept the testimony of natural conscious-
ness that the mind, on its cognitive side, consists partly of 
transparent activities such as we seem to have in normal per-
ception and abstract thought, and partly of content-activities 
such as we find in imagination and memory. Nor can I see any 
objection to the further assumption that the two kinds of 
activities constantly co-operate, so that perception and thought 
contain fragments of imagery. 
Certainly, if you will insist on reducing all mental activity 
to one type, then there are only two courses open for you. You 
either reduce them all to the type of imagination, and say that 
even in perception we apprehend images, and not the things 
directly; or else you reduce it all to the type of transparent 
process, and explain or explain away images as best you can. 
The first of these alternatives is exposed to the fatal objection 
that it makes knowledge impossible, since (on such a theory) 
we are for ever debarred from ascertaining how far, if at all, our 
images represent real things. And as there is nothing in our 
normal perceptual experience to compel us to adopt any such 
view, it would certainly be folly to adopt such a suicidal 
epistemology. The second alternative is not open to such 
fatal objection, but it is, to say the least, very difficult to 
conceive. I t resembles to some extent the attempt to reduce 
all matter to some mode of mere motion—motion of a something 
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which is neither solid, nor liquid, nor gas. You know what this 
theory of matter suggested to Professor James Ward. Well, 
the conception of mind as a system of transparent activities 
reminds me of the same story, and I hope that I shall be 
forgiven for adverting to it. I t is the story of Alice's adventure 
in Wonderland, when she saw the gradual disappearance of the 
Cheshire cat, beginning witli the tip of the tail and ending with 
the grin, which remained some time after the rest of the cat 
had vanished. " Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin," 
thought Alice, " but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious 
thing I ever saw in all my life." 
Professor Alexander, it is true, not only admits, but insists 
t ha t " self " and " self-knowledge " are very real things, although 
the self, as he conceives it, merely consists in transparent acts 
of consciousness, and although consciousness, according to him, 
is always conation, and haa no qualitative differences. Such a 
soul, however, is pure with a vengeance—almost too pure for 
this world ! And this " self-knowledge " is simply synonymous 
with consciousness—the knowledge or consciousness of self 
being merely the knowledge or consciousness which is the self. 
Hence he can maintain that consciousness is always self-
consciousness. But this only helps to confirm the suspicion 
that self-consciousness, in the usual sense of the expression, is 
being degraded to the level of mere consciousness, rather than 
that all consciousness is being levelled up to self-consciousness. 
Moreover, though it is with great diffidence that I venture to 
differ from Professor Alexander, it does not seem to me that his 
view, if I understand him rightly, allows sufficient scope for 
Psychology. If the content of mental activity is always 
physical, and the activity is always of the same quality, the 
distinction between Physics and Psychology seems to be 
reduced to this: that in Physics the objects are described with 
a minimum of reference to mental activity (that is to say, only 
just to allow for the personal equation in observation and 
measurement), while in Psychology the same things are 
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described over again with explicit reference to the process of 
apprehension. But if the process is always the same in kind, 
this seems to be a distinction without a difference. 
The conception of mind as a system of transparent activities 
is, I think, also untenable because of its failure to account for 
the very possibility of dreams and hallucinations. It seems 
impossible to realise how a bare, transparent activity can be 
directed to what is not there, to apprehend what is not given. 
But this is what actually happens in all such abnormal 
experiences. What we have here is something of the nature of 
production, creation, and, at the very least, distortion. But is 
not this rather more than can be legitimately credited to the 
powers of merely transparent processes or activities, or to any 
system of such activities ? A bare activity may, for various 
reasons, fail to operate even when an object is present; it can 
scarcely produce an object not given, or even produce a positive 
modification in a presented object. 
Again, though the subject does not fall within the scope of 
this paper, it may be pointed out that feelings and volitions, as 
distinguished from cognitions, cannot by any means be treated 
as bare, transparent processes. 
§ 14. The Whole Man. 
The difficulty to which reference was made in the preceding 
section, the difficulty, namely, of conceiving mind as merely 
a system of processes or activities, though it is considerably 
increased when these processes are supposed to be transparent, 
is not altogether peculiar to this specially attenuated view of 
mind. In some form or other it lurks more or less in the whole 
of current psychology. And one cannot help sympathising 
with Professor Ward's plea for the admission of the Pure 
Ego into psychology. There is, no doubt, something to be 
said also on behalf of the almost religious anxiety to keep 
psychology " scientific " and free from all metaphysical taint. 
If one could only be quite sure that this does not result merely 
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in the clandestine admission of bad metaphysics! For the 
present, the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism is the 
favourite fence For psychologists to sit on. This implicit 
dualism—another Cartesian legacy!—is, of course, not meta-
physics ! I t is only a temporising, halting metaphysics. I t 
has also something of a theological bias. I am a soul dragging 
about a body, or rather am somehow shadowed by i t : together 
we wander through this vale of tears and the shadow of 
death; but we are silent companions, and hold no converse; we 
are ever so near, yet ever so far! 
To natural consciousness man, the whole man, appears as 
a unity, as a concrete whole, of which mind alone and body 
alone are only abstractions. There may be minds without 
bodies, certainly—at all events we know nothing to the con-
trary. I t seems also obvious that there are bodies without 
minds. But, in any case, what we find in man is a conscious 
body, or an embodied mind. Science, it is true, is necessarily 
abstract. And up to a certain point it is possible, it is 
necessary, and it is legitimate to treat of the mental aspect 
only, or of the physiological aspect only. But that is no reason 
why we should commit ourselves to the " parallelistic " or to 
any other metaphysical theory. A mere description of the 
relationship between body and mind as it appears to natural 
consciousness would, I venture to hold, form a more legitimate 
and more helpful starting point. And, after all, is not this 
apparent unity more or less assumed in various parts of 
psychology ? Does not the psychologist repeatedly fall back 
pon physiological explanations and suggestions ? There is a 
well-known passage in Goethe's Faust where Mephistopheles 
extols the helpfulness of words in Theology and Metaphysics, 
because they readily fill gaps in thought. Something similar 
is true of neuroses in Psychology, and I must beg forgiveness 
for parodying Mephistopheles: 
Yet need we not with too great scruples rack us; 
For just where all psychoses lack us, 
An apt neurosis will serve our turn. 
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Now I have no objections to this method. On the contrary, 
I think it is proper and just. What I would urge is a fuller 
recognition of its implications. I t implies a more intimate 
relationship than mere parallelism between psychoses and 
neuroses. I t implies something more like what appears to 
natural consciousness. 
What we seem to have in a human being is a very complex 
organism exercising mechanical, chemical, vital, and mental 
activities. These activities are not simply collateral or 
parallel activities : they are most intimately interrelated, each 
higher activity in the scale presupposes the lower, without 
which it does not appear to function. I t was this fact which 
gave plausibility to thoroughgoing mechanical theories. But 
this extravagant attempt to explain the higher activities by 
reference to the lowest has deservedly ceased to count as 
a theory to be reckoned with. On the other hand, the 
extremely opposite attempt to level up the lowest to the 
highest, and to spiritualise matter appears to be equally 
extravagant. In the human organism, no doubt, the material 
processes are subservient to higher ends—the mechanical, 
chemical, and vital activities, in a sense, prepare the way for 
the mental activities. Still, systematic interconnection or 
organic unity is one thing, perfect simplicity or homogeneity is 
quite another thing. And while insisting on the advisability 
never to lose sight of the unity of the human organism, we 
must also beware against the specious plausibility of simplify-
ing the complex whole by making it homogeneous with one of 
its constituents, whether mechanical or spiritual. Now what-
ever the ultimate explanation of the interconnection may be, 
the interconnection itself remains a fact. And, as already 
remarked, the higher grade activities of man requisition the 
lower, while the lower appear to take place without the 
higher. This apparent priority of the lower and its apparently 
greater independence in no way affects the reality or the worth 
of the higher. The human organism, in short, exhibits a 
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hierarchy of reactions to, or interactions with, its environment. 
The lower ones may all be summed up as physiological 
responses, the highest as mental responses. There may be, 
there probably are, higher beings than man and higher 
activities than his. But this does not render dubious any part 
of the whole being of man. 
§ 15. Knowledge and Error. 
The reason why we have been insisting on the organic 
unity of the whole man is twofold. In the first place, it helps 
to confirm the validity of normal perception. In the second 
place, it helps us to some extent to surmount the difficulties 
presented by memory, imagination, dreams, and hallucinations. 
As to the first of these topics, namely, the validity of 
normal perception, we may say with Empedocles that " like 
knows like." Whatever we are that also we can know. It is 
because we are bodies exercising physical, vital, and mental 
activities that we can also know beings and modes of being of 
all grades represented in ourselves. It is absurd even to 
pretend to regard our own bodies and activities on the analogy 
of those outside us, instead of treating other bodies and 
activities on the analogy of ours (as we actually do normally). 
We do not merely knovj our own bodies and activities, we feel 
them, we are our bodies and activities. And it is because we 
are these that we know the like of them—like, that is to say, 
either in part or in whole. This is the root of all anthropo-
morphism. Indeed, in the wider sense just explained, all 
human knowledge is essentially anthropomorphic. Of beings 
and modes of being other than ours we can at best only 
suppose or believe that they are; we cannot conceive what they 
are—except by some kind of anthropomorphism. On these 
grounds the higher anthropomorphism may, I think, be 
legitimately defended in matters of religion—but this is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
As regards the second group of topics referred to at the end 
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of the last paragraph but one, some of the difficulties presented 
by memory, imagination, dreams, and hallucinations have 
already been alluded to in the two preceding sections. The 
subject now requires further consideration. 
In § 12 we indicated the difficulty of bringing the processes 
of imagination and memory into line with real presenta-
tionism. Thus far, in fact, we endeavoured to defend real 
presentationism only as a theory of normal perception. We 
have not yet dealt even with abnormal perceptions or halluci-
nations (including dreams). These present considerable diffi-
culties to real presentationism even as a theory of perception. 
The difficulty, however, is of the same kind as that presented 
by imagination and memory. For, so far as we are concerned 
with these subjects, memory, imagination, dreams, and halluci-
nations have the' same feature in common, and present the 
same problem to real presentationism, namely, how to account 
for quasi-pereeptions when things are not presented to us. 
As already suggested in an earlier part of this paper, the 
theory of representative perception really had its origin in an 
attempt to account for error, not for knowledge—for hallucina-
tions and dreams, not for accurate perceptions. The natural 
explanation was that in these experiences we simply have 
images in our heads without any corresponding realities outside 
them. This explanation of common sense is, I think, quite 
right as far as it goes. The trouble arises when it is extended 
also to normal perception so as to interpose images between us 
and the things perceived. As regards imagination, memory, 
and abnormal perception it is, I think, no mere fanciful intro-
jection to say that there are images in our head. And one 
reason why we insisted on the intimate unity of mind and 
body, of psychoses and neuroses, was to defend this common 
view of common sense. 
What we have in all such experiences is not a bare 
transparent mental process, but a content-process, that is to 
say, an activity in which both process and content are mental. 
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Whereas in normal perception there is a mental process 
directed to an external content, in all these cases there is an 
ideal content generated by inner physiological conditions. 
How this happens is certainly a mystery; but I can see no 
valid reason for denying the fact. At all events, this appears 
to me to be an unsophisticated version of the facts. The 
retina normally plays its impartial rdle in the apprehension of 
light when stimulated by an appropriate stimulus; but it also 
somehow generates such a quasi-apprehension of light when 
abnormally stimulated by internal conditions. And such, 
I take it, is the case with other physiological processes. After-
sensations, primary memory-images, dreams, hallucinations, 
and constructive imagination are increasingly complex facts of 
the same general character. If it should be objected: is that 
all, are they simply the results of internally started nervous 
processes ? I can only plead that they are not nearly so 
simple as you appear to think. And after all, is not this, in 
effect, the real assumption of Psychology ? Is not this really 
implied in the custom, already referred to, of advancing 
neuroses to fill the gaps in psychoses ?—witness the physio-
logical "traces" by which memory is explained, and similar 
devices. The specific energy of nerves, and numerous 
pathological facts may, I think, be cited in support of my 
contention. 
This may sound dangerously like materialism, but it would 
be a great mistake to consider it such. Mental processes, we 
maintain, are totally unlike physiological processes, and they 
are of a higher order—they are the end which the physio-
logical processes subserve. And if it is objected that, in that 
case, physiological processes cannot evolve or generate psychical 
processes, because this would infringe on the principle of the 
conservation of energy and what not, the answer is that 
" physiological processes," in the abstract, and " psychical 
processes," in the abstract, certainly appear to be hopelessly 
divorced; but whatever may be the case with such bloodless 
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abstractions, they are nevertheless intimately united in con-
crete reality, and if certain theories will not fit the facts, so 
much the worse for the theories. Living man forms a concrete 
unity, and we only have ourselves to blame if we break him up 
into detached aspects which we cannot put together again. 
Such abstraction is necessary and legitimate up to a point, only 
we must not mistake a convenient convention for an immutable 
reality. 
Now, the above view of " the whole man " enables us to 
keep fairly close to the views of common sense. We can accept 
real presentationism as a theory of normal perception, and we can 
account for memory, imagination, dreams, and hallucinations. 
On the view of representational perception, knowledge seems 
impossible; on the view that the mind is a system of bare 
activities or transparent processes of apprehension, error seems 
impossible. On the above view, both knowledge and error are 
accountable, and certainly in normal life no one seriously doubts 
the existence of either. 
All human knowledge rests ultimately on normal percep-
tion. The sciences form a complex credit system, of which 
normal perceptions constitute the gold reserve. In normal 
perception we apprehend things immediately and as they are, 
though they may be more than we directly apprehend. Normal 
tactual apprehension is the least exposed to suspicion, because 
there is no external medium intervening between us and the 
things apprehended. Where such an external medium inter-
venes, our apprehension may be affected, as happens, for 
instance, through the refraction of light, when, say, a stick is 
partly immersed in water. In such cases a " misapprehension " 
may be corrected by more direct forms of apprehension where 
the mediation is more or less eliminated—as by touching the 
stick, or obtaining a nearer view of a distant object. In the 
case of dreams and hallucinations we have quasi-perceptions 
generated abnormally by internal stimulations of the neuroses 
(or parts of them) actually involved in the corresponding 
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normal perceptions. In normal memory and imagination the 
processes are similar in kind, only in their case we realise that 
there is no external object present at the moment to account 
for these experiences, at least in their entirety. But we need 
not pursue the subject any farther, as our scheme requires no 
changes in the details of the accepted psychological doctrines 
relating to the mental processes with which we are here 
concerned. Some brief remarks may, however, be added on 
the general cosmology of natural realism, and its relation to 
monistic and pluralistic philosophies. 
§ 16. The Gosiiwlogy of Natural Realism. 
On the view of Natural Eealism as defended in this paper, 
the world of reality is what it appears to be to normal per-
ception. It is also a great deal more than that. How much 
more it is we certainly do not know; but by the aid of 
inferences based upon the data furnished by normal perception 
mankind is steadily encroaching upon the vast domain of the 
unperceived. The limits of human progress towards fuller and 
completer knowledge need not trouble us. The precise delimi-
tation of the realms of the Unknowable is a task which may 
safely be left to the care of those who are engaged in compiling 
almanacs for the millenium. It seems a gratuitous and 
unnecessary slur on the future of our race to measure its hopes 
by a modest estimate of our achievements. But, be that as it 
may, the possibility or impossibility of a fuller knowledge need 
not invalidate a knowledge that is less complete, and which can 
indeed be supplemented without being supplanted. The reality 
of other modes of being that we know not of can only enrich, 
and need in no wise undermine the world of reality as it is 
apprehended by natural consciousness. And the world as thus 
apprehended consists of a vast variety of things existing in space 
and in time, and standing in the most varied relations to one 
another. Some of these realities are conscious beings, and one 
of these relations is that of knowledge. Conscious beings 
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cannot, of course, exist as conscious beings independently of 
(their own) consciousness, nor can the relationship of known to 
knower exist independently of (the knower's) consciousness. 
But these obvious exceptions apart, there is no reason to 
suppose that the existence of things and their mutual relations 
is in any way dependent on consciousness. Things are there-
fore independent of consciousness as regards their existence. 
They are also independent of consciousness as regards their 
character, for we have seen no reason for relinquishing the 
assumption of natural consciousness that the objects known are 
in no way modified by being known. Though all things are 
interrelated, if only because of the continua of space and time 
in which they exist, yet their relations exhibit the most diverse 
degrees of intimacy—varying as they do from the most inti-
mate relationship of absolute dependence to that of extreme 
repugnance. The fact of interrelationship suggests a monistic 
interpretation of reality ; while the looseness of many of these 
relations, and the impossibility of having relationships without 
more or less independent terms to be related, support a plural-
istic view. The view that the world consists of a plurality of 
more or less independent things which are variously inter-
related in one continuous space and one continuous time, 
seems to be all that is warranted on the basis of natural 
realism or natural consciousness. That this is no complete 
or perfectly satisfying explanation of the universe must 
be granted. This is attested by the almost universal 
tendency to seek such a further ground of explanation in a 
Deity variously conceived. The monistic tendency to explain 
away diversity is incompatible with natural realism. Even 
the pluralistic view which spiritualises all things and regards 
all things as psychical in character is at best a gratuitous 
hypothesis, and becomes untenable if it in any way attempts 
to explain away the world of material things. I t will never 
do to explain away the physical world as merely symbolical in 
some way of an inner spiritual life. After all, even symbols 
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have a character of their own independently of what they 
symbolise, represent, or suggest. Lilies are lilies whatever else 
they may symbolise. And words are strokes or sounds even 
though what they represent or suggest may be neither strokes 
nor sounds. That there are material things we know. That 
there are animate and conscious beings we also know. That 
material things may have other properties besides those known 
to us is quite possible, in fact, highly probable. That there 
may be conscious beings altogether superior to, and very unlike 
human beings is also highly probable. To make man the 
measure of all things may commend itself to his vanity, but 
scarcely to his reason. Still, probabilities are matters of Faith. 
And although it is necessary to exercise faith, if we are to have 
any satisfactory explanation of the world at all, and although, 
from the nature of the case, such a faith cannot be a matter 
of indifference to us, but must profoundly interest, and 
influence us in various ways, yet it is inadmissible to 
subordinate knowledge to faith, to explain away the known in 
the supposed (and erroneously supposed) interests of what is 
only believed on faith. On the other hand, it may also be 
noted that, although to profess a belief in God is often only to 
give a name to an as yet undiscovered solution of the great 
riddle of the universe, still that is not the only way of leaving 
the riddle, or evading it. 
§ 17. The Independence of Truth. 
At the commencement of this paper reference was made to 
the diffidence (not to say agnosticism or scepticism) of science 
as to the possible attainment of Truth. I t was suggested that 
this diffidence was largely due to the influence of philosophy, 
and that, in a sense, therefore, science was only repaying 
philosophy in its own coin when, in its turn, it helped to give 
birth to Pragmatism. The object of this essay was to vindicate 
the confidence of common sense against these sceptical or 
quasi-sceptical tendencies. I t may therefore be advisable to 
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conclude this paper with a brief vindication of the common 
sense view of Truth as opposed to the pragmatist view. 
According to the common view Truth is something 
objective, and independent of our wishes or hopes, independent 
even of its own practical consequences. I t is assumed as 
a matter of course that truths can be known 01 discovered. 
But although our beliefs may be, and often are, true, it is not 
our believing that makes them true. It is also supposed that 
truths are eternal—once true always true. In apparent 
opposition to this view of Truth, Pragmatism maintains that 
the true is the "expedient in the long run," that " truth 
happens to an idea," that " it becomes true, is made true by 
events."* Such, in brief, is the gist of the opposition. 
There is no need to enter into all the details of the con-
troversy, it will be sufficient to indicate the general lines of our 
defence of the view of common sense from the standpoint of 
natural realism. In justice to Pragmatism it should be stated 
at once that the pragmatist view of truth seems to have been 
directed primarily against Absolute Idealism. One extreme, 
however, does not necessarily warrant another. And, in any 
case, while assaulting Absolute Idealism, Pragmatism has also 
ridden rough-shod over Natural Eealism. In intention, it is 
true, Pragmatism pursues its knight-errantry out of chivalrous 
regard for the feelings of spoiled humanity. I t seeks to restore 
to the plain man those pleasant things which a too exacting 
philosophy has snatched away from him. In effect, however, 
what Pragmatism has really restored to the plain man is, 
not the solid fare which he had fondly believed was his, but a 
mere baby-comforter. Hence the discontent with Pragmatist 
Truth. 
The position, it is here maintained, is as follows. If we 
use the word " belief " in the usual psychological sense, that is 
to say, not as equivalent to " mere belief," but as denoting all 
* W. James, Pragmatism, p. 201. 
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degrees of assertiveness from " mere belief" to absolute know-
ledge, then we may say that a truth is a true belief (or, when 
expressed in language, a true proposition). If so, there can be 
no truth without belief. And since there can be no belief 
without a believer, there can be no truth without a believer. 
To this extent, therefore, truth may be said to depend on man, 
or (to use a familiar pragmatist adjective) to be " man-made." 
This admission, however, must not be misinterpreted. All 
that it really involves is that the existence of the belief depends 
on man, but, granting the existence- of the belief, the truth of 
the belief does not depend on the believer, but is independent 
of him. This is what is meant by the " independence " of truth. 
The truth of a belief depends on the things to which it refers, 
and the reality and character of the things is independent of 
their being known, and is not affected by their becoming 
known. For example, it depends on me whether I look 
at the sky or not; it depends on me, therefore, whether 
or not I think " the sky is clouded." But as soon 
as I have formed this thought or belief, the truth of 
it does not depend on me, but on the facts or realities 
called sky and clouds. Similarly, it depends on me whether 
or not I believe that "Mars is inhabited," But once I do 
believe it, the truth of the belief does not depend on me in 
any way, but solely upon the facts referred to, namely, the 
existence of Mars and its inhabitants (if any), and this does 
not depend on my belief. The independence of Reality, in 
short, gives independence to Truth, notwithstanding the 
dependence of Belief. Even when we realise our beliefs, we 
do not, strictly speaking, make our beliefs true, we only prove 
them to be true. Let us consider the most plausible illustra-
tion given on behalf of Pragmatism. "How many women's 
hearts (exclaims Professor James*) are vanquished by the 
mere sanguine insistence of some man that they must love 
* The Will to Btlieve, p. 24. 
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him! He will not consent to the hypothesis that they 
cannot. The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings 
about that special truth's existence, and so it is in innumerable 
cases of other sorts." It is barbarous to submit the poetry of 
love to the cold scrutiny of logic; but what must not one do 
in the cause of Truth! Now what are the bare facts, stated 
in bare prose ? Eomeo loves Juliet. Let us suppose that he 
believes that Juliet reciprocates his affection, that he there-
upon proposes and is accepted. Taking the rosiest view of the 
case, let us suppose that she accepted him because she loved 
him. Romeo's belief, then, was true, and it was true simply 
because as a matter of fact Juliet did love him, and not 
because he believed that she loved him; she might have loved 
him just as much (perhaps more so) even if from sheer modesty 
he believed that she did not love him, and he never discovered 
the fact. The proposal and the consequent acceptance, then, 
at most only proved the truth of his belief, it did not make it 
true. But perhaps this is not the kind of case contemplated 
by Professor James. Let us suppose a case where the course 
of love did not run quite so smooth. Our Eomeo believing 
that Juliet loves him woos her, but is rejected at first. This, 
of course, would simply prove that his belief was hasty and 
false. He thereupon modifies his belief. He cannot believe 
that she does love him (unless he has reason to suspect con-
cealment) ; but he can still believe that she may come to love 
him provided certain conditions are fulfilled, which it is in his 
power to realise. And after sufficient wooing, we'll say, he 
wins his Juliet. Here again his perseverance with its actual 
happy result only proved the truth of his belief, and did not 
make it true. Juliet might have been just as capable of loving 
him if he persisted, he might have believed this to be the case, 
but fortune might not have favoured him to put his belief to 
the test, and his belief would have been just as true, though 
not proven. That the truth of his belief depended on the 
nature of Juliet, and not simply on his belief, would, of course, 
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have been shown even more decisively if Juliet flatly refused 
him till the end of the chapter. But Professor James seems to 
have no sympathy with rejected suitors. What happens in all 
such cases of beliefs made true is this: X believes, or rather 
hopes, that Yi may, under certain conditions, become Y2, which 
is just what he wants it to be. He thereupon sets about realising 
the requisite conditions, and then his hope or belief is realised. 
This, however, only proves that his belief was true, and does not 
make it true ; if, in spite of realising the conditions which he had 
supposed to be adequate, the desired effect did not follow, that 
would have proved that his belief was false, it would not have 
made it false. But in any case a man's action is, of course, a 
part of reality, and it is not for a moment denied that a man's 
action may work changes in the world. What is denied is that 
his mere belief can affect reality. Belief is indeed necessary 
to direct human energy to the accomplishing of any task ; but 
it is not the mere belief that realises the task, or which makes 
it realisable if, as a matter of fact, it happens to be beyond 
the power of the believer. In fact, the pragmatist view 
might almost be inverted. I t is not the realisation of our 
wishes that makes our beliefs true, but, on the contrary, it is 
the truth of our beliefs (as to what can be done, and how) that 
enables us to realise our wishes. And by the independence of 
truth what is meant is that the truth of a belief is independent 
of mere belief, just because it depends on the world of reality 
(including human agents), which ia independent of our mere 
belief. 
Again, such support as these examples of beliefs followed 
by changes wrought by the believer seem to lend to the 
supposed " mutability" of Truth, results entirely from the 
failure to discriminate between the time in predication and the 
time of predication. When a belief having reference to a 
definite time is expressed at that very time, then there is no 
need to state this explicitly in the predicate. We therefore say 
" S is P " when we mean " S is P at such and such a time." 
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When the time has elapsed it is no longer true to say, " S is P." 
But this is not because the old truth has become false, only 
because this proposition has ceased to express that truth 
adequately. The time in predication, having ceased to coincide 
with the time of predication, must now be stated explicitly in 
the predicate, thus: " S was P at such and such a time." And 
this will always be true, if the assertion " S is P " was true at 
the time when it was asserted. 
The pragmatist conception of Truth, as is suggested by 
the above examples, seems to derive its chief plausibility 
from a confusion between the truth of a belief and the proof 
of a belief. This confusion, or rather the deliberate identifi-
cation of the two, is shown by the pragmatist use of the word 
" verification." Usually, of course, " verification " means the 
testing of a belief, the attempt to prove it, but the pragmatist 
employs the expression in the sense of making a belief true. 
That is why he can speak of truth as an event or a process. 
The testing or proving of a belief is a process, its truth is not. 
Now there are two main kinds of proof, according as the belief 
to be proved refers to things which can be adequately appre-
hended in perception, or not. At the present moment, for 
instance, I believe that the children are in the nursery. The 
truth of this belief depends entirely on whether they really 
are there or not. If I want to prove my belief I can go there 
and look. If I see them there then I have proved my belief 
to be true, but I have not made it true. What makes it true, 
is the children's being there, and my seeing them there does 
not put them there. In fact, it is only their being there that 
enables me to see them there. And so with the innumerable 
variety of similar beliefs. I t is ridiculous to say that such 
beliefs are true simply because they " work," or " lead rightly.,r 
They are true because, and in so far as, the facts are as they 
are believed to be. Our apprehension of the facts, though it 
proves the beliefs to be true, does not make them true. On 
the contrary, it is only in so far as such beliefs are true, that 
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they can be proved to be true by such apprehension. And it 
is idle to object that our apprehension is not conclusive, that 
it may be illusion or dream. For, as Spinoza has pertinently 
remarked, a man who is dreaming may well suppose that he is 
awake, but a man who is awake can never suppose that he is 
dreaming. Some of our beliefs, however, cannot be proved 
in this simple manner. Take, for example, beliefs which are 
universal (not merely enumerative) in character. Some of 
these can be proved absolutely on rational grounds—the 
propositions of geometry, for instance. Others, such as most 
of the hypotheses of science, cannot be proved absolutely, they 
can only be confirmed more and more, in so far as they account 
for, or seem to represent accurately, all the relevant observa-
tions made, and even help us to anticipate future observations. 
In such cases we are dealing with an inverse problem, and it 
is of the nature of an inverse problem, that one cannot as a rule 
be absolutely sure that any one solution represents the actual 
way in which the result in question has come about. All one can 
say in such cases is that if the operative conditions were such 
as those suggested, then this result would necessarily follow; 
but it is just possible that some other conditions might have 
produced this result. Strictly speakiDg, therefore, many of the 
so-called " verified" hypotheses are beliefs that " work " or 
" lead rightly," rather than fully established truths.* But even 
these are either true or false. And their truth or falsity 
depends not on our beliefs, nor on their " right leading," but on 
the independently existing facts to which they refer. Only 
we cannot prove their truth by such simple inspection as sufficed 
* The pragmatist, it is true, denies the existence of unverifiable 
truths—but scarcely with a good conscience. Why is it insisted on that 
it is not always enough for a belief to be expedient for a while, in order 
to be true, but that it must be expedient " in the Imig run " ? Is it not 
because the pragmatist realises that some beliefs are only verifiable at the 
millennium or thereabouts ? If so, of course, there is no need to quarrel 
as to whether these should be described as " unverified" or a* " un-
vorifiable." 
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in the above illustration. If they are true, it is not because 
they " work," but rather they " work " only in so far as they 
are true, either altogether or in part. Again, what has Just 
been remarked of scientific hypotheses applies also to beliefs 
which are not capable (or are not supposed to be capable) of 
verification in the scientific sense. Eeligious beliefs, as already 
suggested, cannot be, and as a rule are not, called Truths in the 
scientific sense. They are popularly called Beliefs or Articles 
of Faith, because, although they are believed to be true, they 
are not regarded as proved true—and that is just why it is 
considered to be a merit to believe them. Now, all that can be 
done in such cases is to observe what effects these beliefs 
appear to have on their professors. But our attitude changes 
to that extent from the intellectual to the moral standpoint. 
Belief's which appear to exercise a good influence on conduct 
may be judged to be good. And however much various beliefs 
or faiths may differ from one another, so long as they appear to 
exercise an equally good influence over their votaries they may 
be considered equally good. But the goodness of a belief is no 
proof of its truth, much less is it identical with it, and conflict-
ing beliefs, though they may be equally good, cannot be equally 
true. Each belief is either true or false, and this depends neither 
on our choice nor on its effects, but on the reality to which it 
refers, and which is independent of our mere beliefs. If it 
should be objected that, after all, Pragmatism is only insisting 
on what has actually been urged in this very paper, namely, 
that we should consider" the whole man," and not merely 
aspects of him divorced from one another, our answer is, so far 
so good, but you do not get the whole by confusing the parts. 
The motive underlying the pragmatist view of Truth is 
certainly praiseworthy. If people could be brought to believe 
that their religious views, however diverse, may yet be 
equally true provided they make them equally good, it would 
certainly make for tolerance. And tolerance is a fine thing. 
But the method is a mistaken one. People of a sympathetic 
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character will realise the primacy of their moral duties, and 
will agree to differ on matters of belief, recognising that 
coercion and bribery are not logical arguments, and that it is 
folly to commit a sure wrong in the supposed interests of a 
possible truth, however strongly they may believe it. The 
zealots, on the other hand, who set themselves up as the only 
and supreme models of humanity, will scarcely be persuaded by 
the logic of Pragmatism. And on most people the effect can 
scarcely be salutary. The suggestion that different beliefs may 
be equally true rather conveys the idea that they are really 
equally doubtful, and that at best we only make-believe. On 
the whole, surely it is a more inspiring conception, even from 
a pragmatist standpoint, that Truth is neither mutable nor 
man-made, and that though we may all approach it along 
different roads, and fall into various pitfalls on the way, yet 
we are all seeking the same fuller and completer knowledge of 
the same real world, which we can also make better as we get 
to know it better. But, be that as it may, Eeality is in the 
main independent of us, and the truth of our beliefs depending, 
as it does, on Eeality, is to that extent independent of us. 
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